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i
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ROBERTA BEVERLY, an individual,

]
]

Supreme Court Case
No.200204125C

Defendants/Appellants/Cross Appellees.
Additional Statement of Facts
In reply to the fact raised in Appellee's response brief, Faulkner submits the
following additional facts:
1.

At oral argument before the trial court, Whitney attempted to argue that
Faulkner's disclaimer was flawed in that it disclaimed an interest only in an
estate, but not Jennie Faulkner's trust. See Hearing Transcript, 14 March
2002, p. 5-6, attached hereto as Exhibit A.

2.

Whitney had only raised this argument for the first time in a reply brief,
giving Faulkner no opportunity to respond or rebut the argument. Faulkner
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objected to this tactic at the hearing. Exhibit A, Hearing Transcript, p. 40
("it's interesting that that particular argument is not articulated, we have a
five inch stack of pleadings, not articulated until the very last pleading that
we don't get a chance to respond to. That's a significant fact.").
The trial court agreed with Faulkner's objection: "I did agree with Mr.
Smith's analysis, Ms. Slawson, on the fact that you did cover something in
your rebuttal that wasn't raised in, in the original and, and wasn't
considered by him in his materials, and from a procedural point frankly I felt
a little uncomfortable with that." Exhibit A, Hearing Transcript, p. 46.
The trial court's conclusions of law do not make the conclusion that the
Disclaimer itself was in any way void or inadequate but only that the prior
receipt of personalty made any disclaimer legally impossible. To the
contrary, the findings predicate the trial court's decision on two points: (a)
the acceptance of trivial items of personalty absolutely precluded any
disclaimer of any other part of the trust estate; and (b) since Faulkner's wife
obtained the property he disclaimed, he could not disclaim and confer the
benefit on her. See Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, Conclusion
fflj 5, 7, and 10, attached hereto as Exhibit B.
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5.

Notwithstanding the trial court's gentle rejection of Whitney's tactic of
raising a new argument in a reply brief and notwithstanding the
concomitant fact that the issue was therefore never properly raised below,
Whitney now gives this argument the honor of primacy in his brief. See
Appellee's Brief, pp. 14-16.

6.

Taken as a whole, Faulkner's disclaimer plainly disclaimed his interest in
his mother's trust estate. It provided:
Whereas, Lawrence C. Faulkner is a beneficiary of the Trust of
Jennie A. Faulkner dated 29 December 1992, and amended on 18
July 1997; and
Whereas, Lawrence C. Faulkner's beneficial interest is a joint
interest with his wife, Renee Faulkner; and
Whereas, Lawrence C. Faulkner desires to renounce and
relinquish all right, title, interest or claim as a beneficiary of the estate
or trust of Jennie A. Faulkner, pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 75-2801.
Now therefore, in consideration of the foregoing, and pursuant
to Utah Code Ann. § 75-2-801,1, Lawrence C. Faulkner, hereby
renounce, relinquish, and otherwise forfeit all my right, title, interest,
or claim as a beneficiary of the estate of Jennie A. Faulkner as
though I had predeceased her.
DATED this 4 day of April [sic: May], 2001.
/s/ Lawrence C. Faulkner

A copy of re Disclaimer is attached as Exhibit C.
3

Summary of Argument
Faulkner's disclaimer was valid, timely and effective. The trial court erred
in failing to give it effect. Rather than joining issue on this central point, Whitney
confuses the issue by discussing an erroneous standard of review. Whitney then
presents an argument that the trial court refused to consider because Whitney
had failed to brief, except in a reply memo; accordingly, the issue was not
preserved for appeal. The bedrock of the trial court's decision, as urged on it by
Whitney, was that the acceptance of any property or benefit under the Trust
absolutely preclude any disclaimer. This conclusion is simply wrong; without this
point, Whitney's entire basis for rejecting the effect of Faulkner's disclaimer
evaporates. The error inherent in this conclusion is pointedly illustrated by the
supporting argument Whitney advanced that since Faulkner is supported by his
wife, he could not disclaim in her favor. This surprisingly gender-biased
argument is without support in the disclaimer statute and is inconsistent with longstanding Utah law and policy.
Whitney's attempt to gain prejudgment interest on the garnishment
judgment is also infirm. Whitney's argument finds no support in the language of
Rule 64D nor in any Utah appellate decision. Instead, Whitney's argument
amounts to nothing more than a sophistic argument without any legal, factual or
4

policy support. To the contrary, Whitney is asking this court to grant him a double
recovery: interest on his full judgment -without discount, accruing at every
moment during the pendency of the garnishment proceeding- and interest on the
garnishment -without discount and accruing at every moment since the
garnishment was served. Whitney fails to address where in Rule 64D any
support for his position exists. Whitney's argument would turn garnishment
practice on its head since, under Whitney's theory, every judgment creditor would
be entitled to interest from the garnishment defendant from the moment of service
of the writ. Financial institutions would suddenly be incurred large interest
obligations from every garnishment. Whitney's request for prejudgment interest
is silly. The trial court rightly rejected it and should be affirmed.
Argument
I.

This Appeal Presents No Mixed Questions of Law and Fact, but
Simply Questions of Law, Subject to De Novo Review.
The judgment and order of the District Court should be reviewed for

correctness. The issue before this Court is whether Defendant Larry Faulkner's,
("Faulkner's,") renunciation of interest in his Mother's estate was sufficient to
comply with the statutory requirements of Utah law. Matters of statutory
construction are reviewed for correctness with no deference given to the trial
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court. See. America First Credit Union v. Dep't of Financial Institutions. 2001 UT
App 272,1J6, 33 P.3d 390. (Citations omitted.)
Whitney's arguments regarding the standard of review simply obscures the
nature of this appeal. Faulkner does not challenge any of the trial court's
"Findings of Fact." However, it is a matter of record that the trial court did not
conduct a trial or make any true factual findings. To the contrary, this case was
decided based upon virtually undisputed facts. While not articulated as such, this
case decided on the basis of a summary judgment standard. As such, this court
is presented exclusively with issues of law for decision.
Whitney attempts to obscure the proper standard of review, arguing that
the trial court was presented with a mixed question of law and fact. In so doing,
Whitney relies on State v. Pena. 869 P.2d 932 (Utah 1994). Pena outlines the
factors to be considered when determining whether a degree of discretion ought
to be left to the trial court on a given matter. The Pena court wrote:
A number of reasons ... are useful in discerning when some degree of
discretion ought to be left to a trial court: (I) when the facts to which the
legal rule is to be applied are so complex and varying that no rule
adequately addressing the relevance of all these facts can be spelled out;
(ii) when the situation to which the legal principle is to be applied is
sufficiently new to the courts that appellate judges are unable to anticipate
and articulate definitively what factors should be outcome determinative;
and (iii) when the trial judge has observed "facts," such as a witness's
appearance and demeanor, relevant to the application of the law that
6

cannot be adequately reflected in the record available to the appellate
courts.
id. at 938-39. (Citations omitted.) The Pena court also noted that interests
weighing in favor of giving a trial court discretion must be counterbalanced by the
need for uniform interpretation of legal rules. ]d. at 939.
The case before this Court has no resemblance to any of the issues
identified in Pena. The facts in this matter are not complex, but are
straightforward and undisputed.1 There were no material disputes, nor
evidentiary hearings held to establish the facts in this matter before the trial court.
For this reason, there were no issues, which the trial court judge was in a better
position to observe, and which cannot be adequately reflected in the record
before this Court. Finally, issues involving renunciation of interests in estates are
nothing new to the appellate courts. The doctrine has existed since the common
law, and this case is not one where an appellate court is unable to anticipate what
factors should be outcome determinative.

1. Appellees incorrectly assert that Appellants take issue with the lower
court's factual determinations. For purposes of this appeal, as noted above,
Appellants have no objection to the purely factual findings made by the lower
court. Appellant's brief in chief did refer to the fact that certain of the trial court's
"Findings" were made on the basis of conflicting evidence- which is a serious
anomaly given the fact that there was no trial and therefore no actual fact-finding
which occurred.
7

Indeed, this case presents a straight forward legal question for resolution.
Specifically, the issue is whether an individual can accept some portion of
personalty passing through an estate, and subsequently disclaim his interest in
the remaining portion of the estate, which passes through a separate provision of
the will. Moreover, this is the type of case that "the appellate court decides ... for
itself and does not defer in any degree to the trial judge's determination of law."
id. at 936.

II.

Whitney Wrongfully Raises Arguments For the First Time On Appeal
The first three pages of Whitney's argument is dedicated to demonstrating

that Faulkner's Disclaimer was ineffective to waive any interest in Jennie
Faulkner's trust. This argument was not properly raised or briefed by Whitney
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before the trial court and should not be considered on appeal.2 Moreover, it is
simply wrong.
Whitney raised his argument that the Disclaimer is ineffective to disclaim
any interest due to its wording -an argument even Whitney's counsel conceded
was "very technical" for thefirsttime in a reply brief and at oral argument in the
trial court Exhibit A, Hearing Transcript, p.5, 40. Faulkner's counsel objected
and the trial court sustained the objection. |d. p. 40, 46. Whitney's argument was
never briefed by Whitney, subject to counter argument by Faulkner or considered
by the trial court. It was not part of the trial court's Findings.
Notwithstanding the impropriety of raising this issue as a new issue in a
reply brief and the trial court's gentle rejection of Whitney's scheme, Whitney now
unfairly again raises this issue. His failure to raise the issue below, except in a
reply brief, precludes consideration of the issue now. See U.P.C.. Inc. v. R.O.A.

2. Perhaps in recognition that this issue was not properly brief and not
considered by the trial court, Whitney claims, in his brief to this court, to have
"raised" this issue before the trial court. Whitney's Opening Brief, p. 14 n.2.
Whitney provides a citation to the record, pages 822 through 825. These four
pages are a portion of a reply brief filed by Whitney six days prior to the oral
arguments before the trial court on 14 March 2002. In fact, the next item in the
court record, page 836, is the court's minute entry following the oral argument.
As noted hereinafter, raising an issue for the first time in a reply brief is not
appropriate and the trial court rejected this tactic. It is equally fallacious to claim
to have raised an issue below by this sort of maneuver.
9

General. Inc.. 1999 UT App. 303, fflf 63-64, 990 P.2d 945 (discussing impropriety
of raising an issue for the first time in a reply memorandum). See also, State v.
Kruqer. 2000 UT 60, U 21,6 P.3d 1116 (discussing similar rule applying to reply
briefs on appeal).
Nevertheless, Whitney's argument is a red herring. It focuses on a single
word in the entire document: "estate." Whitney then concludes that this word, in
the disclaimer provision, cannot apply to a trust estate. Of course, to reach this
point, Whitney must ignore the express recitals and the fact that the trust itself
was attached to the Disclaimer. Whitney's argument simply picks a single word,
ignores the rest of the document, and then constructs a strawman around his
artificial construct. This arcane and -in Whitney's counsel's description- "very
technical" argument should be rejected. The document should be read as any
other document, as an organic whole, to give effect, where possible, to all its
provisions.
This court should refuse to consider Whitney's unbriefed, improperly
raised, ill-considered and erroneous argument. It has no place in the analysis of
this case.

10

III.

Appellant Larry Faulkner Effectively Renounced his Remaining
Interest in his Mother's Estate.
Faulkner's Disclaimer was effective under Utah law. Whitney has cited no

authority by which a claimant cannot partially disclaim his interest in an estate.
Nor has Whitney cited any authority to suggest that Faulkner cannot accept
property passing under one provision of a trust, while disclaiming property under
a separate provision of the trust. Moreover, Whitney has attempted to justify their
position solely by obscuring the correct standard of review and misconstruing the
import of legal authority cited in Appellant's Opening Brief. Case law and sound
legal analysis unambiguously supports Faulkner's position.
First, Whitney argues that First Nat'l Bank of Houston v. Toombs. 431
S.W.2d 404 (Tex. Civ. App. 1968) falls contrary to Faulkner's position, asserting
that the Texas trial court disallowed the disclaimer. This is not the case. The
Toombs court analyzed the nature of the several gifts, some accepted and some
disclaimed, and held that a disclaimant may accept some beneficial provisions
under a will, while disclaiming other burdensome provisions, if the gifts are
separate and independent. The court found the renunciations challenged before
it were "timely, valid, enforceable, and legally binding." ]d. at 407. Indeed, like
the instant matter, the disclaimants in Toombs received separate and
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independent devises, and opted to accept the benefit of one, while later rejecting
the other.
In re Womble. 289 B.R. 836 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. 2003), is similarly in line with
Faulkner's position. In Womble, the disclaimant unilaterally disclaimed all interest
he was entitled to under the estate, even after having accepted a benefit
previously from the estate, id. at 850. Contrary to Whitney's suggestion, Texas,
has requirements similar to Utah's for describing property to be disclaimed. Tex.
Prob. Code Ann. §37A(e) (2003) states, "[A] partial disclaimer shall be effective
only with respect to property expressly described or referred to by category..." Cf.
Utah Code Ann. § 75-2-801. Womble determined that the disclaimer it faced was
sufficient stating, "Womble's alleged acceptance as a beneficiary of the Bentley
homestead prior to executing the disclaimer does not invalidate the disclaimer as
a whole." Womble at 850.
The other cases Whitney cites from Faulkners' brief illustrate Faulkner's
point from the opposite side. For example, in Badouh v. Hale. 22 S.W.2d 392
(Tex. 2000), the disclaimer was rejected because the disclaimant had already
exercised dominion and control over the very property the disclaimant sought to
disclaim. In this case, at most, Faulkner exercised dominion over trivial items of
personalty, passing under a specific provision of the trust, and disclaimed real
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estate sales proceeds passing under the residuary clause of the trust That is not
the case here, where Larry Faulkner received nothing under the provision of his
mother's estate that he sought to renounce. Likewise, in Bank of Delaware v.
Smith. 211 A.2d 591 (Del.Ch. 1965), the renunciation was ineffective because the
gift was a single, aggregate gift, over which the disclaimant had already exercised
partial control. It is undisputed that in this case, Faulkner never had any control
or dominion over the home or the sales proceeds from the home. Unlike Badouh
and Bank of Delaware. Faulkner did not exercise dominion over the property to
be disclaimed, did not accept such property or any benefit under such property,
and therefore, never lost the right to disclaim it.
In the instant matter, the Trust had separate provisions governing the
distribution of her personal property and the residue of her estate. Whitney does
violence to the Trust by conflating these two provisions and arguing that any
acceptance of any property under a Trust precludes any disclaimer. Article
III.2.C. of the Trust governed the distribution of personal property and household
effects. Once personalty was distributed it was no longer part of Jennie
Faulkner's trust estate. Article III.2.D, as amended, provides for a separate
distribution of the remainder of the trust.
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Larry Faulkner properly renounced his interest in that separate provision of
the trust, explicitly referencing the Amendment, which dealt only with that
provision of the trust, and renouncing all right, title, interest, or claim therein.
Indeed, because property had already been distributed under the provisions of
the trust, the only remaining portion of the trust estate in which Larry Faulkner
had any interest at the time of his disclaimer fell under Article III.2.D, as
amended. Larry Faulkner renounced his entire interest therein, and his
renunciation was legally effective under Utah Code Ann. § 75-2-801 to disclaim
Faulkner's remaining interest in her mother's trust and estate.
Whitney never really joins issue on this point. It is undisputed that Faulkner
accepted some items of personalty under Article III.2.C of the Trust. It is
undisputed that the gifts of personalty are physically and legally separate and
distinct from the real property and real property proceeds. It is also undisputed
that Faulkner had no role in the sale of the house or ever accepted any of the
proceeds from the sale of the home. Whitney simply aggregates these separate
items of property and the separate terms of the Trust without comment, as the
unstated assumption of his argument. This argument is without legal or factual
support and should be rejected. Case law uniformly stands for the principle that
one can accept some property and disclaim other property so long as the gifts are
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divisible. These fact being undeniable in this case, there was no impediment to
Whitney's disclaimer of all his right, title, interest or claim as a beneficiary."
Exhibit C. The trial court erred in concluding otherwise.

IV.

The Trial Court Erred in Ruling that Mr. Faulkner Could Not Disclaim
in Favor of his Wife.
In its Conclusions of Law, drafted by Whitney's counsel, the district court

held:
The Court finds, alternatively that Mr. Faulkner obtained a benefit from the
Trust in that Mr. Faulkner receives all of his support and maintenance from
his wife who is the other residuary beneficiary of the Trust. Mr. Faulkner's
receipt of a benefit from the Trust bars and invalidates his disclaimer of the
Trust property.
Conclusion of Law No. 7, Exhibit C. Interestingly, Whitney's' counsel would now
treat this conclusion as a finding of fact as well. While a determination that Mr.
Faulkner received a benefit from trust property may be a finding of fact, the
Court's conclusion that Mr. Faulkner's renunciation was invalidated because of
the purely theoretical and "very technical" notion that Faulkner may derivatively
benefit from his wife's good fortune in inheriting from her mother-in-law.3

3. Taken to its logical conclusion, this argument dissolves all bands of
separate property between spouses. For example, if my wife inherits the house
in which we live, my creditor may argue, under Whitney's theory, that since I
15

Whitney cites no authority, other than a questionable interpretation of the
statute, that would preclude a husband from disclaiming in favor of a wife, or vice
versa. This interpretation runs directly counter to the rights of married persons to
hold property and income free from the reach of the other spouse's creditors
under Utah Code Ann. § 30-2-5(2) (2003). Whitney has provided no response to
the applicability of this statute, or to the other arguments made concerning a
wife's rights under Utah law. However, application of Utah Code Ann. § 75-2801(5) (2003) in the manner suggested by Whitney would run in direct violation of
these well-established principles. As such, the trial court's legal determination
concerning renunciation in favor of a spouse is in error and should be reversed by
this Court.

V.

Whitney is Not Entitled to Prejudgment interest.
In his Cross Appeal, Whitney argues that the trial judge erred in failing to

award prejudgment interest. Even if Whitney were correct in asserting that funds
should have been withheld from Jennie Faulkner's estate, there is no legal basis
for exacting prejudgment interest of Renee Faulkner, as a garnishee.

benefit from having a place to live, my wife's property is now subject to my
creditor's claims. In this case, that is the exact effect of Whitney's argument.
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Whitney correctly assert that in Utah, the Courts have held that the award
or denial of prejudgment interest is a question of law, reviewed for correctness.
See. Lvon v. Burton. 2000 UT 55, lf73, 5 P.3d 616; Cornia v. Wilcox. 898 P.2d
1379,1387 (Utah 1995). However, this standard of review runs directly counter
to those of several other states who hold that determinations of prejudgment
interest should only be reversed for abuse of discretion. See, e.g.. Dillon v.
Montgomery. 67 P.3d 93, 96 (Idaho 2003); Blair Const.. Inc. v. McBeth. 44 P.3d
1244, 1251-52 (Kan. 2002); Musto v. Vidas. 754 A.2d 586, 598 (N.J. Super. Ct.
App. Div. 2000); Purcell Const.. Inc. v. Welch. 17 S.W.3d 398, 402 (Tex. Ct. App.
2000); Pauley v. Gilbert. 522 S.E.2d 208, 213 (W.Va. 1999); Bopp v. Brames.
713 N.E.2d 866, 872 (Ind. Ct. App. 1999); Ditto v. McCurdv. 947 P.2d 961, 979
(Haw. Ct. App. 1997); In re Estate of Wernick. 535 N.E.2d 876, 888 (III. 1989).
Moreover, given the inherently factual nature of the determination of prejudgment
interest under this state's Case law, as will be discussed herein, this Court would
do well do change the standard of review accordingly.
However, regardless of the standard of review, Whitney cannot establish
entitlement to prejudgment interest. First, the authorities cited by Whitney do not
apply to the instant matter. Whitney relies on Utah Code Ann. §15-1-1 (2003).
The plain language of this statute limits its application to actions involving
17

contract. Furthermore, while §15-1-1 establishes a default rate of interest at ten
percent, it does not create an independent right to interest where none otherwise
exists. See. Vali Convalescent and Care Institutions v. Div. of Health Care
Financing. 797 P.2d 438, 445 (Utah Ct. App. 1990).
Second, Whitney's' reliance on archaic Case law is utterly misplaced.
Under Wasatch Mining Co. v. Crescent Mining Co.. 24 P. 586 (1890), the Court
found that interest may be allowed in the absence of statute or contract.
However, this decision, which pre-dates statehood does not create a right to
prejudgment interest, nor does it comport with stricter requirements placed on
awards of prejudgment interest since that time. Moreover, Wasatch Mining in no
way analyzes or comports with the provisions of Rule 64D. An analysis of the
rules governing garnishments, and the case law rules governing awards of
prejudgment interest demonstrates that the trial court correctly denied Whitney
the relief sought. In fact, while Whitney cites to numerous cases in the portion of
his brief claiming a right to interest, Whitney is unable to cite to a single case in
which any Utah court has ever awarded interest on a garnishment. This is true
for a simple reason: there are none.
Whitney's misplaced interest claim stems from his utter misapprehension of
the effect of a garnishment. Whitney states, in his brief, that "Ms. Faulkner owed
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Mr. Faulkner, and thus Mr. Whitney." Whitney Brief, p. 31. Utah law is clear that
a garnishment plaintiff stands in the same shoes as the garnishment defendant
with respect to the judgment debtor, becoming, in effect, subrogated to the
garnishment defendant. Lang v. Lang. 403 P.2d 655, 657 & n.3 (Utah 1965),
quoting Nat'l Bank of Tucson v. Reininoer Mining & Smelting Co.. 295 P. 79, 80
(Cal. Ct. App. 1931). However, Whitney does not acquire more rights than
Faulkner would have had against Renee. Renee promptly disbursed the trust
upon receipt of the sales proceeds. Faulkner would have had no claim for
prejudgment interest against Renee; accordingly, neither does Whitney.
The express terms of Rule 64D strongly indicate that no prejudgment
interest may be granted against a garnishee defendant. For example, under the
provisions to ascertain whether property is exempt from garnishment or not
subject to garnishment, if the court concludes that the property may be garnished
"it shall issue an order to pay the Property Subject to Garnishment directly to
plaintiff or plaintiff's attorney or as otherwise ordered by the court." Utah R. Civ.
P. 64D(h)(iii). Similarly, if matters other than exemptions or ownership of
garnished property are raised, following the resolution of the dispute, "judgment
shall be entered upon the verdict or finding the same as if the garnishee had
answered according to such verdict or finding." Utah R. Civ. P. 64D(I). In either
19

case, only the Property Subject to Garnishment is to be paid over. There is no
mention of any interest because no interest is intended under the rule.
In the context of a post-judgment collection garnishment, like the present
case, this makes great sense. Since a judgment is already in place, the judgment
creditor is fully protected in that the judgment is incurring interest at the lawful
post-judgment rate. When a garnishment is issued to a third party, interest
continues on the whole judgment until the garnishment proceeds are paid over;
the judgment creditor thus recovers a full measure of compensation.
Whitney's argument unfairly and impermissibly creates, in effect, two
judgments: the original judgment, upon which the writ of garnishment issued and
a new, second judgment, arising from the writ itself. So, in this case, Whitney's
argument goes, he is entitled to post-judgment interest on his $500,000+
judgment and additionally, post-judgment interest on the $29,000.00
garnishment, for exactly the same time period. Thus, during the two years this
matter has been pending, Whitney claims entitlement to interest on both the
$500,000 judgment and the $29,000 garnishment. This claim is, as noted above,
utterly without support in the law.
Furthermore, an allowance of prejudgment interest against a garnishee
runs contrary to the reasoning underlying judicial rules allowing its award. Under
20

Utah Case law, prejudgment interest has specific, defined purposes. "As a
matter of public policy, award of prejudgment interest simply serves to
compensate a party for the depreciating value of the amount owed over time and,
as a corollary, deters parties from intentionally withholding an amount that is
liquidated and owing." Trail Mountain Coal Co. v. Utah Div. of State Lands and
Forestry, 921 P.2d 1365,1370 (Utah 1996). See, also. Campbell. Maack &
Sessions v. DeBrv. 2001 UT App 397,1J23, 38 P.3d 984; Lefavi v. Bertoch. 2000
UT App 5, H24, 994 P.2d 817; Baker v. Dataphase. 781 F.Supp. 724, 731
(D.Utah 1992).
Whitney's argument would play havoc with the trial courts. Suddenly,
every time a writ of garnishment issued, a new judgment would be created.
When a bank or credit union received a writ of garnishment on an account,
suddenly, the bank or credit union itself would be liable for interest on the
garnished amount, even through the rule itself allows the bank to wait for a
garnishee release order. Whitney's argument makes no allowance for these
practical considerations.
Of course, these practical considerations have grown up around Rule 64D
itself. Garnishee defendants are required to answer the writ and interrogatories.
If there is a dispute, upon resolution, the Garnishee Defendant is liable, at most,
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for the Property Subject to Garnishment. The judgment creditor is fully protected
by the fact that the judgment continues to accrue interest. However, the mere
fact that there is a dispute to resolve does not create a new right to additional
interest. Such, however, is exactly Whitney's argument.
There is simply no basis for an award of interest. Rule 64D does not so
provide and indeed, strongly indicates no such entitlement. The mere fact that
Whitney's primary legal support is a case predating statehood and the adoption of
the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure is also a strong indication that Whitney's
argument is misplaced. Practical considerations and basic fairness should doom
Whitney's efforts to obtain a double recovery. The cross-appeal should be
rejected and the trial court's refusal to grant post-judgment interest on both the
underlying judgment and the garnished funds should be affirmed.

Conclusion
Mr. Faulkner executed a valid renunciation of interest, which specifically
disclaimed his interest in the remainder of his mother's Trust Estate, which
passed under a separate residuary clause. Mr. Faulkner's prior acceptance of
personal property did not affect or limit his ability to disclaim under Utah Code
Ann. §75-2-801. Nor was Mr. Faulkner prevented from disclaiming his interest
22

where the benefit would pass to his wife. Mr. Faulkner's renunciation should be
given full legal effect and the trial court's decision reversed in that regards. As to
prejudgment interest, there is no basis under Utah law for an award of
prejudgment interest against Renee Faulkner as garnishee. There is no provision
for such an award under the Rules of Civil Procedure, and this case does not
satisfy the Case law requirements for prejudgment interest in this state.
Oral Argument Requested.
DATED this

f

day of / \ U f l

, 2003.

CLfBrad C.Smith
Attorney for Appellants

Certificate of Service
I hereby certify that I mailed two true and correct copies of the foregoing
Appellant's Reply Brief, postage prepaid, this 1 day of jQJA* 2003, to the
,
following:
'J
Kira M. Slawson
BLACKBURN & STOLL, L.C.
77 West 200 South, Suite 400
Salt Lake City, UT 84101
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IN THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT - OGDEN COURT
WEBER COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

2
3
4

DAVID C. WHITNEY, et al.,

5

Plaintiff,

6
7

MOTIONS

vs.
LARRY FAULKNER, et al,

Case
Appeal

960900213
20020412-SC

8
Defendant.

Judge Stanton M. Taylor

9
10
11
12
13
14

BE IT REMEMBERED

that this matter came on for hearing

before the above-named court on March 14, 2002.
WHEREUPON, the parties appearing and represented by
counsel, the following proceedings were held:

15
16
17
18

CERTIFIED TRANSCRIPT

19
(From Electronic Recording)
20
21
22

OOP*

23
24
25
PENNY C. ABBOTT, REPORTER-TRANSCRIBER
LIC. 122-102811-7801
PHONE: (801) 423-1009 FAX: (801) 423-2663

1

deals, that came from a trust.

If the property is devolved

2

to the person by revocable trust the statute requires that

3

the written disclaimer generally must be made within nine

4

months that the revocable trust became irrevocable.

5

case that would have been the date of death.

In this

The disclaimer

6 must be delivered to the person who has legal title to the
7

property.

8

Faulkner.

9

or registered mail in order for it to be a valid

10
11

In this case that would be the trustee, Ranae
And it must be delivered in person or by certified

disclaimer.
Because the Utah disclaimer statute has different

12

procedures for property that devolves by will or intestacy

13

and property that devolves by trust or contract, the intended

14

disclaimant must properly designate the specific property

15

being disclaimed and strictly comply with the statutory

16

requirements particular to that kind of property.

17

It is undisputed in this case that Mr. Faulkner is

18

the beneficiary of his mother's estate.

19

undisputed that he is a named beneficiary of her trust, and

20

that's the Jenny A. Faulkner trust that I'm referring to.

21

It is also

On May 4th of 2001 Larry Faulkner's attorney

22

prepared an instrument entitled Renunciation of Interest, and

23

this was prepared purportedly in compliance with Utah Code

24

Annotated 75-2-801.

25

renunciation of interest state that Mr. Faulkner quote:

Although the recitals of the

WHITNEY VS. FAULKNER MARCH 14, 2002
Penny C. Abbott, Reporter/Transcriber

"desires to renounce and relinquish all

1
2

right, title and interest or claim as a

3

beneficiary of the estate or trust of

4

Jenny A. Faulkner pursuant to Utah code."

5

Mr. Faulkner did not effectively renunciate his

6

interest as the beneficiary of the trust.

Rather, the

7

renunciation stated in the body of the renunciation now, not

8

the recitals but the actual renunciation, renunciation itself

9

stated:
"Now, therefor, in consideration of the

10
11

foregoing and pursuant to Utah Code

12

Annotated 75-2-801, I, Lawrence C.

13

Faulkner hereby renounce, relinquish and

14

otherwise forfeit all my right, title and

15

interest or claim as a beneficiary of the

16

estate of Jenny A. Faulkner as though I

17

had predeceased her."

18

The language of Mr. Faulkner's renunciation only

19

disclaims his interest as a beneficiary of the estate, not as

20

a beneficiary of the trust.
Now, Your Honor, I realize this is a very technical

21
22

argument.

But in order for a disclaimer to be valid it must

23

comply strictly with the technical requirements of the

24

statute.

25

Mr. Faulkner were standing before this Court seeking a

Let's turn this whole thing around.

If

WHITNEY VS. FAULKNER MARCH 14, 2002
Penny C. Abbott, Reporter/Transcriber-

1

indicated, it seems to me there's no warrant in the law that

2

says it has to be strict and hypertechnical.

3

there are things in the law that we have to do that with.

4

This statute, however, says nothing about that.

5

Now certainly

It should be noted this statute is in derogation of

6

the common law.

7

your interest in a trust.

8

is that statutes in derogation of the common law are to be

9

literally construed, not strictly and hypertechnically

10

At common law you had no right to disclaim
The public policy of this state

construed.
And so in this case I think if they want to now

11
12

point out, and I have to emphasize this, this argument that

13

while the language of the disclaimer itself...

14

admittedly this is cutting close to my particular bone

15

because after all I wrote the dang thing.

16

saying now that there's a problem with that language, it's

17

interesting that that particular argument is not articulated,

18

we have a five inch stack of pleadings, not articulated until

19

the very last pleading that we don't get a chance to respond

20

to.

21

And

But if we're

That's a significant fact.
But it seems to me it also would be incumbent if

22

we're talking about a substantial compliance sort of

23

analysis, somehow they have to show some prejudice that

24

somehow somewhere somebody has been prejudiced as a result of

25

our failure to strictly and hypertechnically comply with the
WHITNEY VS. FAULKNER MARCH 14, 2002
Penny C. Abbott, Reporter/Transcriber

1

you know, completely clear.

2

the most sense, at least it does to me.

3

Court or the Court of Appeals might very well disagree.

4

MS. SLAWSON:

5

THE JUDGE:

I think, I think this is makes
Perhaps the Supreme

Thank you, Your Honor.
Thank you.

And, and I, I would have

6

to say, Counsel, that, that the written materials were most

7

helpful (short inaudible, no mic).
I did, I did agree with Mr. Smith's analysis,

8
9

Ms. Slawson, on the fact that you did cover something in your

10

rebuttal that wasn't raised in, in the original and, and

11

wasn't considered by him in his materials, and from a

12

procedural point frankly I felt a little uncomfortable with

13

that.

14

MS. SLAWSON:

15

THE JUDGE:

16

MS. SLAWSON:

17

Yes, Your Honor.
Court is in recess.
Thank you, Judge.

WHEREUPON, the hearing was concluded.

18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
WHITNEY VS. FAULKNER MARCH 14, 2002
Penny C. Abbott, Reporter/TransrriKor
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This matter came before the Court on the Garnishee Defendant, Renee Faulkner's Motion
to Quash Garnishment, and the Traverse Complaint of Plaintiffs, David C. Whitney, Whitney
Enterprises, Inc. and Con-Blast, Inc. (herein "Whitney") on March 14,2002, at 1:30 p.m., the
Honorable Stanton M. Taylor presiding. The parties briefed the issues in Defendant's
Memorandum in Support of Motion to Quash, Plaintiffs' Memorandum in Opposition to Motion
to Quash and in Support of Traverse, Defendant's Reply Memorandum in Support of Motion to
Quash and in Opposition to Traverse, and Plaintiffs Reply Memorandum in Support of Traverse
and in Opposition to Motion to Quash.
The Court having reviewed the parties' memoranda and citations to the record contained
therein, having heard oral argument in this matter, and having considered the statements and
admissions of the parties, and being fully advised in the premises, now makes the following:
FINDINGS OF FACT
1.

Plaintiffs have an outstanding unsatisfied judgment against Larry Faulkner and

Roberta Beverly.
2.

Larry Faulkner has not been formally employed since 1993. Mr. Faulkner's

mother, Jennie A. Faulkner, was his only source of income from 1993 until her death in 2000.
Mr. Faulkner has not had a bank account in at least five years.
3.

For the past 24 years, Larry Faulkner has lived at 3608 West 6000 South, Roy,

Utah with his wife, Renee Faulkner. Mr. Whitney obtained a judgment lien on the home in
approximately June 1988, which was released by Mr. Whitney in 1988 in consideration of the
receipt of $10,000.00. The home has been in the name of Renee Faulkner since approximately
1991, when Larry Faulkner transferred his interest in the home to Renee Faulkner.
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4.

Larry Faulkner does not own a car, but drives a 1995 Toyota 4-Runner that

belongs to Renee Faulkner. Larry Faulkner's gas money for the Toyota, at least in the year 2001,
has come from Renee Faulkner. Larry Faulkner's spending money in the year 2001 also came
from Renee Faulkner.
5.

Renee Faulkner pays the credit card bills for the Visa credit card and the Chevron

credit card that Lany Faulkner uses.
6.

Presently, Renee Faulkner is Mr. Faulkner's only source of money.

7.

On December 29, 1992, Jennie A. Faulkner, the mother of defendant Larry

Faulkner, created a trust called the Jennie A. Faulkner Trust. She transferred her house at 1255
21* Street, Ogden, Utah (the "Home") into that trust by Warranty Deed on December 30, 1992.
Jennie A. Faulkner amended and restated the trust on January 18, 1996 in a document entitled
Amendment and Restatement of Trust (herein referred to as the "Trust"). Exhibit B to Faulkner's
Memorandum in Support of Motion to Quash.
8.

The Trust provided that upon Jennie's death, the Home in the name of the Trust

*ras to be sold and the assets of the Trust were to be divided into three equal shares for the
)enefit of Jennie Faulkner's three children, Marilyn Clements, Glenda Burnside, and Lany
7

aulkner. Pursuant to the Trust, items of personal and household eflfects were to be distributed to

ndividuals as set forth in "Exhibit B" to the Trust. In the event that not all of the personal and
lousehold items were disposed of by "Exhibit B," the personal and household items not listed on
Exhibit B" were to go to Jennie A. Faulkner's children in approximate equal shares.
9.

On January 18, 1997, Jennie Faulkner again amended her Trust. This was the last

mendment to the Trust. The July 18, 1997 Amendment is referred to herein as "Amendment to
rust." See Exhibit C to Faulkner's Memorandum in Support of Motion to Quash.
1

10.

Under the Amendment to Trust, Jennie Faulkner changed the distribution of her

Trust. Instead of the Trust being divided equally among her three children, Jennie Faulkner left
$30,000.00 or 30% (whichever was less) of the Trust estate to her two daughters and grandsons,
and the remaining 70% to "Lawrence and Renee A. Faulkner." In the event that either Lawrence
or Renee predeceased Jennie, the survivor was to succeed to the entire 70% interest in the Trust
estate.
11.

Jennie A. Faulkner died on November 9,2000.

12.

Renee Faulkner was appointed successor trustee under the terms of the Trust.

13.

On November 18, 2000, Larry Faulkner, Glenda Burnside, Christie Zabriski,

"Ray" Pete Clements, Ronnie Clements, and Frank Zabriski met at Jennie's home to distribute
the personal property.
14.

Some of the personal property of the Trust was located at Jennie's home, and the

remainder of the personal property was located at the home of Renee and Larry Faulkner. The
property located at Jennie's Home was distribute at the November 18th meeting to the three
children, Glenda, Lany, and Marilyn or their representatives, and the children took possession of
the property.
15.

On November 19, 2000, there was a meeting at Renee and Larry Faulkner's house.

The purpose of this meeting was to distribute the personal property which was referred to on
"Exhibit B" to the Trust, which had not been distributed at the meeting the day before.
16.

Present at the November 19, 2000 meeting were Renee Faulkner, Larry Faulkner,

Christie Zabriski, and Glenda Burnside.
17.

"Exhibit B" to the Trust provided that Glenda Burnside would receive the

following property from the Trust:
4

18.

a.
b.
c.
d.

Castle picture;
Hutch with China and table settings;
Weddingrings- original;
Diamond earrings; and

e.

White rug.

"Exhibit B" to the Trust provided that Glenda Burnside's child, Mike, would

receive the VCRfromthe Trust.
19.

"Exhibit B" to the Trust provided that Lany and Renee Faulkner would receive

the following personal propertyfromthe Trust:

20.

a.
b.
c.
d.
e.
£

Solitaire diamond;
Diamond necklace;
Bookcases;
Microwave;
Silverware;
Anniversary clock; and

g.

Orange and green rug.

"Exhibit B" to the Trust provided that Renee Faulkner would receive a "ring" and

any vehicle owned by Jennie Faulkner or the Trust at the time of Jennie's death,fromthe Trust.
21.

"Exhibit B" to the Trust provided that Larry's child, Ben, would receive the stereo

from the Trust.
22.

"Exhibit B" to the Trust provided that Larry's child, Chris, would receive the

VCR/Cassette holderfromthe Trust.
23.

"Exhibit B" to the Trust provided that Marilyn Clements would receive the

following personal
a.
b.
c.
d.

propertyfromthe Trust:
Black onyxringwith diamond;
Smoke lamp;
Plaques on the wall (butterfly andflower);and
Saw clock.
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24.

"Exhibit B" to the Trust provided that Marilyn's child, Chris, would receive a

"ring"fromthe Trust.
25.

"Exhibit B" to the Trust provided that Marilyn's child, Robin, would also receive

"ring"fromthe Trust.
26.

On November 19,2000, the items from "Exhibit B" to the Trust designated for

Glenda Bumside, Marilyn Clements, Marilyn's daughter Chris, and Marilyn's daughter Robin
were distributed to Glenda Bumside on behalf of Glenda, Marilyn, Chris, and Robin.
27.

On approximately January 14, 2001, Trustee Renee Faulkner prepared an

inventory of the Jennie Faulkner Estate and an accounting of the distributions made from the
Trust (hereinafter referred to as "List of Distributions''). Exhibit 7 to Plaintiffs Memorandum in
Support of Traverse and in Opposition to Motion to Quash.
28.

The List of Distributions was prepared to demonstrate how the personal property

of the Jennie A. Faulkner Trust had been distributed.
29.

The List of Distributions indicates that specific items of personal property were

distributed to Glenda Bumside, Marilyn Clements and Larry Faulkner.
30.

As set forth in the List of Distributions, Larry Faulkner personally took possession

of several items of personal property from the Trust, including the "Exhibit B" items, television
and TV stand, mattress, towels, camera, binoculars, yard tools, clock, wood mirrors, various
pictures, crystal nut dishes, tablecloths, kiln, various figurines and knickknacks, hide-a-bed,
Christmas lights, vacuum cleaner, patio swing, bed, and mirror.
31.

Larry Faulkner also received Jennie A. Faulkner's opal ring.

32.

The home of Jennie A. Faulkner (owned by the Trust) was sold in April 2001, and

the proceeds of sale were delivered to Renee Faulkner as Trustee on May I, 2001. The net

proceeds of the sale of the home were $84,635.05, and there was an additional $1,820.58 cash
from a Trust bank account which was held by the Trustee. The total cash in the Trust estate was
$86,455.63 as of May 2, 2001.
33.

On May 2, 2001, Orders in Supplemental Proceedings were issued against Roberta

Beverly and Larry Faulkner.
34.

On May 4,2001, Roberta Beverly was served with an Order in Supplemental

Proceedings in this case which ordered her to not dispose of any of her assets pending the hearing.
35.

On May 4, 2001, Renee Faulkner as Trustee directed her attorney, Brad Smith, to

distribute the cash assets from the Trust to the beneficiaries as follows:

36.

a.
b.
c.
d.

Glenda Burnside:
Marilyn Clements:
Benjamin Faulkner:
Christopher Faulkner:

$10,000.00;
$5,000.00;
$8,645.56;
$4,322.78; and

e.

Renee Faulkner:

$58,487.29.

On May 10, 2001, an Order in Supplemental Proceedings was served on Larry

aulkner, and a Writ of Garnishment was served on Renee Faulkner in her individual capacity as
arnishee.
37.

The Order in Supplemental Proceedings served on Larry Faulkner on May 10,

301, restrained Mr. Faulkner from assigning or disposing of any of his assets prior to the
lpplemental Proceedings Order hearing.
38.

The Writ of Garnishment served on Renee Faulkner, as Garnishee, attached any

onies in her possession which belonged to Larry Faulkner, and directed that she pay such funds
Plaintiff or the Court.

39.

At the time Renee Faulkner was served with her Writ of Garnishment, she had

received her alleged distribution of $58,487.29 from the Trust and had deposited it into her
personal bank account.
40.

On May 4, 2001, Larry Faulkner executed a document entitled "Renunciation of

Interest." In the Renunciation of Interest executed by Larry Faulkner, the recitals of the
Renunciation of Interest state that Mr. Faulkner "desires to renounce and relinquish all right, title,
interest, or claim as a beneficiary of the Estate or Trust of Jennie A. Faulkner pursuant to Utah
Code Ann. §75-2-801."
41.

The operative provisions of the Renunciation state, "Now, therefore, in

consideration of the foregoing, and pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 75-2-801,1, Larry C. Faulkner,
hereby renounce, relinquish and otherwise forfeit all myright,title, interest, or claim as a
beneficiary of the Estate of Jennie A. Faulkner as though I had predeceased her."
42.

The Renunciation of Interest was filed in the Second District Court under Civil

No. 013900149, on May 4, 2001.
43.

Prior to May 4, 2001, the date that the Renunciation of Interest was executed and

filed with the court, Larry Faulkner had taken possession of items of personal property from the
Jennie A. Faulkner Trust, including the items listed on the List of Distributions, the "Exhibit B"
items, and the opal ring.
44.

Larry Faulkner did not disclaim, or attempt to disclaim, his interest in the Jennie A.

Faulkner Estate or Trust prior to May 4, 2001.
45.

Pursuant to stipulation by the parties and order of the Court dated, July 5, 2001,

the $29,243.64 in question was deposited in Bank of Utah Account No. 1878442, to be held until
further order of the Court or stipulation of all the parties (the "Escrowed Funds").

CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1.

Utah Code Ann. §75-2-801 provides:

(1) A person, or the representative of a person, to whom an interest in or with respect to
property or an interest therein devolves by whatever means may disclaim it in whole or in
part by delivering or filing a written disclaimer under this section

(5) The right to disclaim property or an interest therein is barred by:
(a) an assignment, conveyance, encumbrance, pledge, or transfer of the property or
interest, or a contract therefor,
(b) a written waiver of therightto disclaim;
(c) an acceptance of the property or interest or a benefit under it; or
(d) a sale of the property or interest under judicial sale made before the disclaimer
is made.
2.

While U.C.A. §75-2-801(1) allows partial or fractional disclaimers, Mr.

Faulkner's disclaimer is clearly not a disclaimer of a partial or fractional interest.
3.

It is uncontroverted that in his disclaimer executed on May 4, 2001, Larry

Faulkner purported to "renounce, relinquish, and otherwise forfeit all [his] right, title, interest, or
claim as a beneficiary of the estate of Jennie A. Faulkner."
4.

It is also uncontroverted that Mr. Faulkner took items of personal property

belonging to the Trust prior to executing his disclaimer.
5.

Pursuant to Utah Code Ann. §75-2-80 l(5)(c), Mr. Faulkner was barred from

disclaiming his interest in the Trust because he had already taken and accepted property from the
Trust as a beneficiary of the trust. The courtfindsthat Mr. Faulkner's Renunciation of Interest
was invalid and inoperative.

6.

Pursuant to Utah Code Ann. §75-2-80 l(5)(c), a disclaimer is also barred if the

intended disclaimant has taken a benefit from the property sought to be disclaimed.
7.

The Court finds, alternatively, that Mr. Faulkner obtained a benefit from the Trust

in that Mr. Faulkner receives all of his support and maintenance from his wife who is the other
residuary beneficiary of the Trust. Mr. Faulkner's receipt of a benefit from the Trust bars and
invalidates his disclaimer of the Trust property.
8.

Since disclosures permitted under U.C.A. §75-2-801 are in derogation of the

statutory and common law rights of creditors, disclaimers should be strictly construed. The
language of Mr. Faulkner's disclaimer states that he his disclaiming "all [his] right, title,
interest, or claim as a beneficiary of the estate of Jennie A. Faulkner." Mr. Faulkner's disclaimer
does not disclaim a partial or fractional interest. The Court will not rewrite Mr. Faulkner's
disclaimer to say something it does not say. The disclaimer, as executed by Mr. Faulkner, is
barred and invalidated by Mr. Faulkner's prior acceptance of Trust personalty.
9.

On May 10, 2001, at the time the Writ of Garnishment was served upon Renee

Faulkner, she was in possession of $29,243.64, which rightfully belonged to Larry Faulkner as
a beneficiary of the Trust of Jennie A. Faulkner.
10.

For each of die foregoing reasons, the Court finds that Mr. Faulkner's

Renunciation of Interest was invalid.
11.

The Motion to Quash the Writ of Garnishment should be denied, and Plaintiffs

should be granted judgment against Renee Faulkner on the Traverse Complaint, for the sum of
$29,243.64, plus costs pursuant to Rules 64D(i) and 54(d), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure,
with post-judgment interest thereon as provided by law.
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12.

Pursuant to the Writ of Garnishment, Renee Faulkner, as Garnishee Defendant

should be hereby ordered to deliver to Plaintiffs' counsel the Escrowed Funds which shall be
applied as a credit to the Garnishee Judgment
DATED this

0

day of

//vLflsj

, 2002.
'

BY THE COURT

Judge'Stanton M. T&ylor
District Court Judge
Approved as to form:
STEVENSON & SMITH, P.C.

Brad C. Smith
Attorney for Renee Faulkner and
Larry Faulkner
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Exhibit C
Faulkner's Disclaimer

Renunciation of Interest
Whereas, Lawrence C. Faulkner is a beneficiary of the Trust of Jennie A Faulkner dated
29 December 1992, and amended on 18 July 1997; and
Whereas, Lawrence C. Faulkner's beneficial interest is a joint interest with his wife,
Renee Faulkner; and
Whereas, Lawrence C. Faulkner desires to renounce and relinquish all right, title, interest
or claim as a beneficiary of the estate or trust of Jennie A. Faulkner, pursuant to Utah Code Ann.
§75-2-801.
Now therefore, in consideration of the foregoing, and pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 75-2801,1, Lawrence C. Faulkner, hereby renounce, relinquish, and otherwise forfeit all my right,
title, interest, or claim as a beneficiary of the estate of Jennie A. Faulkner as though I had
predeased her.
DATED this ^

County of Weber
State of Utah

dav of April, 2001.

)
:ss
)

On this 4^ day of April 2001, personally appeared before me, Lawrence C. Faulkner,
Deing personally known to me or having identified himself by photographic identification, and
said and deposed that he has read the foregoing document, that he understands the terms of the
foregoing document, and that he has executed it as his free and voluntary act.
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COMM.EXR 11-06-2001

Notary Public

